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INTRODUCTION
Prior to opening statements in U.S.A. v. Crippen,1 a federal criminal
DMCA case, U.S. District Judge Phillip Gutierrez vented his frustration
during a 30-minute tirade to prosecutors. “I really don’t understand what
we’re doing here,” he began.2 The defendant, Matthew Crippen, was charged
with two counts of violating the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA,
facing a maximum of five years in prison for each count. The government
alleged that Crippen ran a business modifying the firmware on Xbox systems
to make them capable of running pirated copies of games. Crippen asserted

1.
2.

U.S.A. v. Crippen, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143583 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
David Kravets, Xbox-Modding Judge Berates Prosecution, Puts Trial on Hold, WIRED –
THREAT LEVEL, (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/xbox-judge-riled.
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the Betamax defense,3 arguing that his firmware modifications were legal
because they had significant non-infringing uses, such as allowing the user to
run alternative software or to make backup copies of their own games.
Prosecutors responded that the DMCA did not allow a defendant in a § 1201
action to use the defenses of traditional copyright law, such as the Betamax
defense. Judge Gutierrez seemed to think (and this author agrees) that the
anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions in § 1201 are oddly
disconnected from familiar copyright law and policy.
The root of Judge Gutierrez’s frustration is that the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions are in direct conflict with traditional intellectual
property doctrine and public policy. Thanks to the misinterpretation of the
statute, the lack of any relationship between these provisions and traditional
copyright protection has allowed for absurd conclusions, bizarre limitations of
fair use, and obtuse applications of the law that threaten long-standing policy
goals of intellectual property law and antitrust law.
The Chamberlain line of cases provided an opportunity for the Federal
Circuit to examine the balance between the DMCA’s prohibition of
unauthorized access and traditional copyright protection, in light of
consumers’ expectations regarding the products they own. Misinterpretation
of the DMCA was threatening to create a dangerous new property right, the
right of access, completely detached from the traditional bundle of rights in §
106 of the Copyright Act, resulting in two distinct copyright regimes. In
Chamberlain III, the Federal Circuit countered the threat of access right
theory, adding a new limitation to the scope of § 1201: a reasonable relation
between access and the traditional protections of copyright. The Federal
Circuit’s reasonable relation test brought § 1201 of the DMCA back in
harmony with the rest of the Copyright Act and its legislative intent, restoring
the balance between the interests of content owners in countering the digital
threat and consumers’ expectations regarding the products they own.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected the Federal Circuit’s
reasonable relation test in MDY Industries, breathing new life into the notion
that § 1201 creates a new right of access, distinct from the rights of traditional
copyright law. Because the two holdings are completely incompatible, with
the Ninth Circuit expressly rejecting the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of §
1201, the result is a circuit split. The time is ripe for either a Supreme Court
review or Congressional action to determine which court got it right.
The first part of this paper discusses the original policy goals of the
DMCA. In the second part, I examine the issues in Chamberlain I & II. In
the third part, I discuss the dangers of creating a new property right in the
3.

Sony Corp. of Am, v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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DMCA, the right of access. In the fourth part, I consider how the Federal
Circuit corrected this misinterpretation in Chamberlain III, adding a new
limitation to § 1201: a reasonable relation between access and the traditional
rights of copyright. In the fifth part, I propose several reasonable relationship
tests. In the sixth part, I examine the Ninth Circuit’s contrasting treatment of
§ 1201 in MDY Industries. Finally, I give my conclusions.
I. ORIGINAL POLICY GOALS OF THE DMCA
To protect copyright owners from the “digital threat,” Congress enacted
the DMCA, which created a new cause of action that prohibits unauthorized
access to a copyrighted work that is protected by a technological measure.
Congress wrote the DMCA in 1998 to implement two treaties adopted by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): the WIPO Copyright
Treaty and the WIPO Phonograms Treaty.4 These treaties required signing
nations to enact laws providing “adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures in
connection with the exercise of their rights.”5 Existing U.S. copyright laws
had already addressed most of the obligations of the WIPO treaty. However,
new statutes were needed to implement the protection of the “technological
measures” referred to in the treaty language that, in turn, protected
copyrighted works. At about the same time, content owners were lobbying
Congress for greater protection for their works to counter the “digital threat.”
The content industry’s concern over the copying of digital media and the
threat it posed to copyright was well-founded, at least in theory. Due to the
unique nature of digital content, it can be copied as many times as desired
without any loss of quality. The simultaneous rise of the Internet made the
transmission of those digital copies cheap, easy, and virtually instantaneous.
To the content industry, the combination of the two was frightening. In the
past, copyright owners would shut down printing presses to stop illegal
copying, countering the infringement one source at a time.
However, this new digital threat was something completely different,
more like an infectious disease. One pristine digital copy could be transmitted
to another person, that person could copy and transmit, and so on. Very
quickly, one infringing copy of a work could become thousands, even
millions of infringing copies. Moreover, the strategy of attacking the source
was useless against this new digital threat because the sources were
distributed throughout the population. A single illegal printing press is
4. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 315–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
5. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996; World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996.
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relatively easy to find, but when the source becomes thousands of personal
computers in individual living rooms, the problem becomes too large to attack
in the old way.
To rights owners, the only solution was to prevent all unauthorized digital
copying completely, locking down digital content using encryption and other
technological measures. However, they realized that this protection was
highly vulnerable for the same reasons their content was threatened. In a
digital future, only one person needs to discover a way to defeat the
protection, and then this method can be transmitted rapidly through the
Internet. To protect the protection, rights owners convinced Congress that
new laws were needed.
To that end, the DMCA added chapter twelve, “Copyright Protection and
Management Systems,” to the Copyright Act. Among the provisions is §
1201,6 which made it illegal to circumvent the technological measures that
protect digital content (the anti-circumvention provisions). This section also
made it illegal to traffic in devices that accomplish such circumvention (the
anti-trafficking provisions). At issue in this paper are the provisions in §
1201(a), which specifically protect “access control” measures, prohibiting
both the circumvention of and the trafficking in devices used to circumvent
such measures.
The anti-circumvention provision, § 1201(a)(1)(A), provides that no
person may “circumvent a technological protection measure” used by the
copyright owner which “effectively controls access” to a copyrighted work.7
As defined in the DMCA, a technological measure effectively controls access
to a work “if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the
application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of
the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.”8 To circumvent such a
technological measure is “to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a
technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner.”9
The anti-trafficking provision, § 1201(a)(2), prohibits manufacturing,
importing, or otherwise trafficking in any means that “is primarily
designed . . . for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work . . . [,] has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent . . . [, or] is marketed . . .

6.
7.
8.
9.

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
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for use in circumventing a technological measure.”10 Violation of this antitrafficking provision led to the main cause of action in Chamberlain. Since
its enactment, most DMCA cases dealing with circumvention have been antitrafficking cases because it is much easier for plaintiffs to target a single
device manufacturer or software developer rather than pursue many individual
anti-circumvention actions.
Three features of chapter twelve are noteworthy. First, § 1203 created a
new civil cause of action—completely separate from actions for infringement
elsewhere in the Copyright Act—for “any persons injured by a violation” of
§§ 1201 or 1202.11 Damages can include injunctive relief, impoundment of
equipment, actual and statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.12
Second, § 1204 created a new criminal offense—also separate from criminal
offenses for copyright infringement—for willful violations of §§ 1201 or 1202
for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.13
Third, and most importantly, § 1201 only prohibits unauthorized access to
a work. This is a dispositive issue in Chamberlain, and the principle is firmly
rooted in DMCA legislative history. As the House Judiciary Committee
Report noted, this important distinction prohibits an individual from being
able to “circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a work, but [an
individual] would be able to [circumvent] in order to make fair use of a work
which he or she has acquired lawfully.”14
By enacting the DMCA § 1201 provisions, Congress intended to be
responsive to content owner’s concerns toward the digital threat and protect
the walls of encryption protecting their content from unauthorized access.
However, they set in motion a divergence between DMCA access protection,
traditional copyright protection, and the expectations of consumers. This
divergence would be examined in Chamberlain v. Skylink.
II. CHAMBERLAIN I & II
Chamberlain I and II provided an opportunity for courts to examine the
balance between the DMCA’s prohibition of unauthorized access and
traditional copyright protection, in light of consumers’ expectations regarding
the products they own. Plaintiff Chamberlain manufactured and sold garage
doors together with hand-held remote transmitters, or remote controls. In this

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A)–(C).
Id. § 1203(a).
Id. § 1203(b)–(c).
Id. § 1204(a).
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998).
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case, the technology at issue was the garage door opener (GDO) system.15 A
GDO facilitates the opening of the garage door through an opening device
when a user activates the remote transmitter. The opening device is mounted
on the door and consists of both a receiver with associated signal processing
software and a motor to open and close the door. A homeowner wishing to
open or close the garage door activates the remote transmitter, which sends a
radio frequency signal to the receiver located on the opening device. Upon
receiving a recognized signal from the transmitter, the signal processing
software activates the opening device and commands the motor to open or
close the door.
In Chamberlain’s Security+ line of GDOs, the system uses a copyrighted
“rolling code” computer program that, for enhanced security purposes,
constantly changes the transmitter signal required to open the door.16 The
remote transmitter is only able to generate a limited number of codes, and
Chamberlain was concerned that homeowners with multiple residences may
exhaust all the possible codes while out of range of one of the openers and not
be able to activate that opener when they return.17 To prevent this,
Chamberlain developed a “resynchronization” sequence, which would
activate the door after comparing and calculating two signals sent one after
the other in rapid succession.
Competing with Chamberlain, Defendant Skylink manufactured and sold
a universal GDO transmitter that could operate Chamberlain’s GDO
systems.18 Skylink’s Model 39 was designed to interoperate with common
GDOs, whether they used a “rolling code” computer program or not.19
Although Model 39 does not use “rolling code” technology, it is able to
simulate the effect of the rolling code. By sending three codes in rapid
succession, Skylink’s transmitter triggers the resynchronization sequence in
Chamberlain’s GDO. As a result, one press of the button on a Skylink
universal remote transmitter will activate the opening device mounted on
Chamberlain’s doors.20
Chamberlain never explicitly restricted its customers from using other
types of remote transmitters with its GDOs.21 Skylink marketed its Model 39
universal transmitter to consumers either as a replacement for a lost remote

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 1184.
Id.
Id. at n.3.
Id. at 1184–85.
Id. at 1183.
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transmitter or as a spare.22 The Federal Circuit found that Chamberlain and
Skylink were the only significant distributors of universal GDO remote
transmitters.23 Further, the court found that “[a]ftermarket consumers have
long been able to purchase ‘universal transmitters’ that they can program to
interoperate with their GDO system regardless of make or model.”24
Chamberlain sued Skylink under the civil cause of action created in §
1203, alleging a violation of the anti-trafficking provision in § 1201(a)(2).
Chamberlain argued (1) that its GDO software was a copyrighted work
protected by a technological measure and (2) that Skylink’s universal remote
transmitter was primarily designed for the purpose of circumventing that
technological measure, which effectively controls access to its software.
Chamberlain had registered both the software that controls the opening
device and the software that controls its remote transmitter with the Copyright
Office.25 There was some dispute between the parties as to whether the
registered software code was exactly the same as used in Chamberlain’s
products. However, the court assumed as a matter of law that all the software
code in question was protected by copyright, either directly or as a derivative
work.26
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois tried the case and
issued two separate decisions. In the first decision (Chamberlain I), the court
denied Chamberlain’s motion for summary judgment on its § 1201(a)(2)
claim.27 The court found a triable dispute of material fact “concerning
whether the computer program in Chamberlain’s rolling code is a work
protected by copyright and whether the owner of a Chamberlain rolling code
GDO is authorized to use the Model 39 universal transmitter” (emphasis
added).28
In the second decision (Chamberlain II), which followed shortly
thereafter, the court granted Skylink’s motion for summary judgment.29 The
district court rejected Chamberlain’s § 1201(a)(2) claim, holding (1) that
Chamberlain had not met the burden of proof for showing that Skylink’s
Model 39 transmitter was an “unauthorized” access to Chamberlain’s
software and (2) that Chamberlain neither explicitly restricted the ability of
22.
2003).
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030–32 (N.D. Ill.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
Id.
Chamberlain, 292 F. Supp. 2d. at 1024–25.
Id. at 1040.
Id.
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purchasers of its GDOs to buy an “unauthorized” (replacement or spare)
transmitter from third parties, nor were purchasers implicitly bound to use
only “authorized” devices.30 The court further maintained that consumers had
a reasonable expectation of having the ability to “replace the original product
with a competing, universal product without violating federal law.”31
Chamberlain appealed this second decision before the Federal Circuit in
Chamberlain III.32
In arguments for appeal before the Federal Circuit, Chamberlain argued
that the only way for Skylink’s universal remote transmitter to operate
Chamberlain’s GDO is by “accessing” copyrighted software through
circumvention of its rolling code protection, thereby committing a per se
violation of § 1201(a)(2).33 Effectively, Chamberlain was rebutting the
holding in Chamberlain II by asserting that all access to a protected work was
per se unauthorized by statute—beyond access by the rights owners’ own
system, presumably—and that the issue of implicit or explicit authorization in
Chamberlain I & II was irrelevant to a § 1201(a) violation. Chamberlain did
not allege that Skylink infringed any of its § 106 rights under traditional
copyright law, nor did it allege that Skylink contributed to third-party
infringement of those rights. Rather, Chamberlain asserted a dangerous new
property right, completely detached from the traditional “bundle of rights” in
§ 106: the right of access.34
III. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
Misinterpretation of the DMCA threatened to create a dangerous new
property right, the right of access, completely detached from the traditional
bundle of rights in § 106 of the Copyright Act, resulting in two distinct
copyright regimes. To the Federal Circuit, Skylink’s asserted separation—
between the traditional protections of copyright and the protection of access in
§ 1201(a)—would create two distinct copyright regimes.35 The first, a
traditional “protection” regime, would extend only the traditional bundle of
rights in § 106 to owners of a copyrighted work protected by a technological
measure. These rights would be subject to all the additions, exceptions, and
limitations in the rest of the Copyright Act, including the fair use exceptions
in § 107. Owners can seek relief through the traditional infringement actions

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1044–45.
Id. at 1046.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d 1178.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
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in Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act, with additional ability to hold traffickers in
circumvention devices liable under § 1201(b). These § 1201(b) violations,
however, are linked to § 106 rights.36
The second, an “access” regime, would extend a new right of access to
owners of a copyrighted work protected by a technological measure.37 This
right amounts to a new property right in copyright law and seems to be
without limitation. Owners can seek relief through the separate cause of
action for § 1201(a) violations. This cause of action is not dependent on any
infringement of § 106 rights, as Chamberlain argued before the Federal
Circuit.
Table 1: Two distinct copyright regimes created by DMCA misinterpretation.
Protection Regime
Access Regime
Copyrighted works protected Copyrighted works
Eligible
by a technological measure
protected by a technological
works
measure
Bundle of rights enumerated Access right in § 1201(a), a
Rights
new property right without
in § 106 , subject to all the
limitation
additions, exceptions, and
limitations in the rest of the
Copyright Act
Chapter 5 protections against Separate cause of action for
Causes of
violation of § 1201(a),
infringement, plus separate
action
cause of action for violation detached from infringement
of § 106 rights
of § 1201(b) linked to
infringement of § 106 rights
Up to this point, this paper has concentrated on § 1201(a), which prohibits
unauthorized access to a copyrighted work protected by a technological
measure. There is a companion sub-section, § 1201(b), which prohibits
trafficking in devices that circumvent rights, or “copy-control,” technological
measures. This provision is only applicable, however, when a technological
measure effectively “protects the right of a copyright owner under this title in
a work or portion thereof.”38 Therefore, the protections in § 1201(b) are
linked to § 106 rights, and presumably apply after initial lawful access is
obtained.39
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1199–1200.
Id. at 1200.
17 U.S.C. 1201(b)(1)(A–C).
Zohar Efroni, A Momentary Lapse of Reason: Digital Copyright, the DMCA and a Dose
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One theory of § 1201 interpretation sheds light on this regime split. As
described by Zohar Efroni, “access right theory” presumes that Congress
intentionally created a new exclusive right to control access to copyrighted
works in § 1201(a), while § 1201(b) is intended to protect traditional rights.40
Liability for violating the right of access is unrelated to, and independent of,
copyright infringement liability. As a result, all traditional limitations on
copyright infringement liability are not applicable to an access right violation.
This is the theory that Skylink used as the basis for its argument in
Chamberlain III.
This new property right, the right of access, has the following
characteristics:41 (1) the right of access is not codified in § 106 of the
Copyright Act, but resides separately in the new Chapter 12; (2) authors must
employ technological protection measures within the meaning of the DMCA
in order to receive legal protection; (3) the standard for violating the access
right is not copyright infringement, but rather circumvention or trafficking in
circumvention devices; (4) violation of the access right is a completely
independent cause of action; and (5) defendants accused of violating the
access right may only assert the special defenses afforded by § 1201.
However, an interpretation of § 1201 by “access right theory” resulting in
this new right of access creates a number of serious problems, some of them
very dangerous to public policy goals. A key statutory problem is that the
access right is inconsistent with a key limitation within the same section, in §
1201(c)(1). That section provides that “nothing . . . shall affect rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair
use, under this title.”42 As the Federal Circuit noted, creation of a completely
new property right of access would clearly affect rights, limitations, remedies,
and defenses in the Copyright Act.43 The interpretation of a right of access in
§ 1201(a) flatly contradicts a plain reading of § 1201(c)(1). More
importantly, the lack of any relationship between the right of access and
traditional copyright allows for distorted applications of § 1201(a) that reach
absurd conclusions, which threaten long-standing policy goals of intellectual
property and antitrust.
First, access right theory renders § 1201(a) completely blind to the
defendant’s intent. An individual could circumvent a technological protection
measure that happens to be protecting a copyrighted work, and be liable for

of Common Sense, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249, 285 (2005).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 294–95.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1).
43. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200.
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violating an access right regardless of whether the defendant intended to
infringe. The Federal Circuit noted that disabling a burglar alarm in a house
with copyrighted books inside would be a per se violation of § 1201(a) under
this interpretation.44 Tort and criminal laws are the proper deterrents for this
sort of behavior, not the DMCA. Besides, the law should not be so blind as to
permit ridiculous conclusions such as this; silly applications of statutes
undermine the social legitimacy that undergirds all laws.
Second, access right theory allows an individual or company to insert a
single copyrighted element to its product, protect it with a nominal
technological measure, and commit an array of mischief with antitrust and
intellectual property policies.45 From an antitrust standpoint, any company
could use the threat of per se § 1201(a) violations to restrict competition by
creating aftermarket monopolies in opposition to both antitrust and copyright
misuse doctrines. From an intellectual property standpoint, any company
could use the right of access to impart patent-like protection to a device, but
with a potentially unlimited duration. If the device contains even a single
copyrighted element, a “protected” device will have the weight of § 1201(a)
protection for a copyright duration. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent the
device manufacturer from “refreshing” the copyrighted element periodically,
thus potentially extending the duration of protection infinitely. Such device
protection is an absurd distortion of copyright doctrine.
This divergence in copyright regimes desperately needed to be addressed
by the federal courts, in order to place § 1201 back into harmony with
traditional copyright law. In Chamberlain III, the Federal Circuit took the
challenge.
IV. CHAMBERLAIN III: REASONABLE RELATION
In Chamberlain III, the Federal Circuit countered the threat of access right
theory, adding a new limitation to the scope of § 1201: a reasonable relation
between access and the traditional protections of copyright. In deciding
Chamberlain III, the Federal Circuit could have ignored Chamberlain’s right
of access argument and simply affirmed Chamberlain II, restricting itself to
the unauthorized access issue, and it would have reached the same result.
Thankfully, the court chose to confront Chamberlain’s argument head on. In
doing so, the Federal Circuit adopted a theory of § 1201 interpretation that is
more internally consistent and is in complete harmony with traditional

44. Id. at 1201.
45. Heather A. Sapp, Note, Garage Doors and Toner Cartridges: Why Congress Should
Revisit the Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 135, 146–47
(2006).

ARTHUR FORMATTED FINAL WITH ADDITION (DO NOT DELETE)

276

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

5/24/2013 11:54 AM

[Vol. 17:2

copyright law, along with antitrust and intellectual property policy.
An alternative to access rights theory, “ancillary action theory” presumes
that Congress merely intended to create an ancillary cause of action to
traditional copyright infringement in § 1201(a).46 Liability under this cause of
action is related to traditional copyright infringement because the legislative
intent was merely to add statutory protection for the new technological
measures that protect copyrighted works against the new “digital threat.”
Since no separate right of access is created in § 1201, then liability must be
linked to traditional copyright infringement, with all of its traditional
exceptions and limitations. This is the theory that the Federal Circuit applied
in Chamberlain III.
Under this theory, the Federal Circuit held that § 1201 does not create a
new property right; rather, it simply provides property owners with new ways
to secure their property.47 While acknowledging that the severance of access
from protection is plausible when viewed out of context,48 such a division
would lead to results “so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.”49
When viewed in context with the total statutory structure of the Copyright
Act, other provisions of the DMCA, and Congressional intent, it becomes
clear that the DMCA granted additional legal protections to copyright owners,
but did not rescind “the basic bargain granting the public noninfringing and
fair uses of copyrighted materials, § 1201(c) . . . .”50
In order to correct the misinterpretation of § 1201(a), the Federal Circuit
formed a new rule for § 1201(a)(2) violations:
A plaintiff alleging a violation of § 1201(a)(2) must prove: (1)
ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively controlled by
a technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that third
parties can now access (4) without authorization, in a manner that (5)
infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by the Copyright
Act, because of a product that (6) the defendant either (i) designed or
produced primarily for circumvention; (ii) made available despite only
limited commercial significance other than circumvention; or (iii)
marketed for use in circumvention of the controlling technological

46. Efroni, supra note 39, at 286.
47. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193-94.
48. Id. at 1199.
49. Id. at 1202 (quoting Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 US 164, 188).
50. Id. at 1202.
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measure.51
A plaintiff must establish the first five elements to prove a prima facie
case. A plaintiff need only establish one of the sub-elements in (6) to shift the
burden to the defendant. Most importantly, the Federal Circuit elaborated on
element (5), holding that a plaintiff must prove a “reasonable relationship” or
“nexus” between the alleged access and the traditional copyright owner’s
rights.52
Using this rule, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor
of Skylink. The court held that (1) Chamberlain failed to show a reasonable
relationship between Skylink’s access and an infringement of Chamberlain’s
copyright, and (2) Chamberlain failed to show that Skylink’s access was not
authorized.53
The Federal Circuit’s decision changed the application of § 1201 for the
better, bringing it into harmony with the rest of copyright law by using the
ancillary action theory of interpretation. However, the decision left much
ground to cover. For example, how would a plaintiff in future anti-trafficking
cases show a reasonable relationship?
V. REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TESTS
Six possible “reasonable relationship” tests give courts a wide range of
methods to implement Chamberlain III’s new limitation on § 1201(a)(2)
violations. To show a prima facie § 1201(a)(2) violation, a plaintiff must
show a reasonable relationship between a defendant’s access of the plaintiff’s
copyrighted work and the protections that the Copyright Act grants to the
plaintiff. Without defining a specific test to apply, however, Chamberlain III
makes it difficult for others to apply this holding. Zoe Argento proposes six
possible “reasonable relationship” tests: (1) but-for causality, (2) reasonable
foreseeability, (3) substantial non-infringing use, (4) defendant’s intent, (5)
vicarious liability, and (6) the Aimster balancing test.54
To help understand the approaches, I will apply each test to the facts in
RealNetworks v. Streambox.55 Plaintiff RealNetworks is a software developer
that markets a method for content providers to deliver streaming audio and
51. Id. at 1203.
52. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
53. Id.
54. Zoe Argento, Interpreting Chamberlain’s “Reasonable Relation” Between Access and
Infringement in the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 2008 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 102902,
15 (November 2008).
55. RealNetworks, Inc., v. Streambox, Inc., No. C9-2070 P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).

ARTHUR FORMATTED FINAL WITH ADDITION (DO NOT DELETE)

278

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

5/24/2013 11:54 AM

[Vol. 17:2

video to website visitors. Its software only allows customers to stream the
content on demand, not download it for later viewing. To protect the content,
RealNetworks software utilizes a secret “handshake” between its player
(which resides on the user’s computer) and its server (which is operated by
the content provider). This secret handshaking protocol ensures that only
RealNetworks players can view RealNetworks protected content. Defendant
Streambox makes a series of software products that allows users to download
RealNetworks content by circumventing the handshaking protocol.
RealNetworks sued Streambox, claiming a § 1201(a)(2) anti-trafficking
violation. RealNetworks argued that Streambox’s software is primarily
designed to circumvent a technological measure (the handshaking protocol)
that protects access to a copyrighted work (the copyrighted audio and video).
After users of Streambox’s software have downloaded the RealNetworksprotected copyrighted content, it has no further protection against a user’s
subsequent infringement by copying, distribution, or preparation of derivative
work. For the purposes of this illustration, I will assume that there is evidence
that at least some of the Streambox users have illegally copied downloaded
content.
A. But-for causality
The classic but-for test is very simple: but for the action, the result would
not have happened. In the case of a § 1201(a)(2) violation, a plaintiff would
have to demonstrate that but for the defendant’s circumvention of access, the
violation of the copyright owner’s § 106 rights would not have happened.
This is an extremely low bar for the plaintiff, and it would be rare to find a
case where this test would not be satisfied.
In the RealNetworks case, the test would be satisfied. But for the
circumvention of the handshake protocol by Streambox’s software,
subsequent infringement of the downloaded audio and video would not have
happened.
B. Reasonable foreseeability
This next test introduces a reasonable person element to the analysis:
would a reasonable person in a similar situation reasonably foresee the
outcome? In the case of a § 1201(a)(2) violation, a plaintiff would have to
demonstrate that a reasonable person in similar circumstances as the
defendant should have foreseen a violation of the copyright owner’s § 106
rights through use of the circumvention device. This is a higher bar for the
plaintiff and involves the very familiar reasonable person element. It has the
significant advantage of giving a court the latitude to make an equitable
judgment on the facts. However, it also creates a burden on potential
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defendants to manage their risk of § 1201 liability by being conscious of the
foreseeable infringement potential of their devices.
In the RealNetworks case, the test would likely be satisfied. Streambox
was a sophisticated software developer, very familiar with RealNetworks’
protocols and the reasons for protecting content from download. Moreover,
their software also disabled a “copy switch” in the content, allowing the
content to be copied. Streambox should have foreseen that users of its
software may violate the content provider’s § 106 rights. However, if the
software developer was much less sophisticated, or if Streambox’s software
did not disable the “copy switch,” then this test might not be satisfied.
C. Substantial non-infringing use
This third test revives and modifies the rule in Sony v. Universal (The
Betamax case): that a circumvention device is legal if it has a substantial noninfringing use. Previously, the use of this rule for DMCA cases would have
been barred because, under the access right theory, legality of the access is
tested separately from the infringement. The Sony test would have been
barred. By bringing the two back together with the ancillary action theory,
Chamberlain III has potentially revived Sony’s relevance in DMCA cases.
This would be a welcome addition to DMCA law, because the Sony court
formed the test to balance the rights of copyright owners with the reasonable
expectations of consumers, which is exactly what the Chamberlain courts
were struggling with. The inclusion of this test would give courts a wellunderstood test to apply in DMCA cases. In the case of a § 1201(a)(2)
violation, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that a circumvention device
that could result in infringement of a copyright owner’s § 106 rights does not
have a substantial non-infringing use.
In the RealNetworks case, the test may be satisfied, but would depend
heavily on the facts. In Sony, VCR users were overwhelmingly using their
devices to time-shift, not copy, copyrighted works. In RealNetworks, this is
not as clear. If RealNetworks could show that a substantial number of
Streambox’s customers were using its software to illegally copy downloaded
content instead of simply time-shifting, the test would likely be satisfied.
D. Defendant’s intent
This fourth test is a highly subjective analysis into the defendant’s intent
in creating the circumvention device: did the defendant create the device with
the intention of infringing or facilitating infringement of copyrighted works?
This analysis would likely assess the defendant’s commercial motive and
degree of sophistication. In the case of a § 1201(a)(2) violation, a plaintiff
would have to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally created a
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circumvention device for the purpose of facilitating a violation of the
copyright owner’s § 106 rights. Depending on the facts, this could be a
difficult bar to meet.
In the RealNetworks case, this test is difficult to evaluate because the facts
do not address the subjective intent of the Streambox developers. This test
could be difficult to meet simply because of evidentiary requirements. To
show a prima facie case, plaintiff RealNetworks would have to obtain
Streambox internal documents and emails, which would involve extensive
discovery. For that reason alone, widespread use of this test would probably
cause most § 1201 cases to settle.
E. Vicarious liability
This fifth test is a bit different from the others, in that it applies to parties
other than the creator of the circumvention device. To establish a reasonable
relationship to third parties, a plaintiff would have to show that the party was
vicariously liable. In the case of a § 1201(a)(2) violation, a plaintiff would
have to demonstrate that the defendant either (1) received financial benefit
from the creator of the circumvention device or (2) had the right and ability to
control the creator’s actions. This test would mirror vicarious infringement
liability in traditional copyright law, extending the access liability along the
same lines of culpability.
In the RealNetworks case, this test could apply if the Streambox software
was initially created by an employee on his own time and RealNetworks sued
the employee. RealNetworks could then sue Streambox under the vicarious
liability test. Then RealNetworks would have to show that Streambox either
benefited from the employee’s circumvention device or had the right and
ability to control the employee’s actions. This would be another fact-based
inquiry involving internal documents.
F. Aimster balancing test
This final test is based on Judge Posner’s proposed balancing test in In re
Aimster: “If the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a
contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it would
have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce
substantially the infringing uses.”56 Posner’s test balances the cost of
preventing infringing uses with the amount of damage the infringing uses
would cause to copyright owners. In the case of a § 1201(a)(2) violation, a
plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the amount of damage sustained by

56.

In re: Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003).
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violation of the copyright owner’s § 106 rights is greater than the cost the
defendant would have incurred if he would have eliminated all infringing uses
of his circumvention device. This test also has roots in the Hand Formula in
tort law, which also determines liability by balancing burden of prevention
with cost of injury. This would also be a fact-based inquiry, but a more
focused one than the test of intent. The inquiry would concentrate economic
analysis, which has the possibility of being more objective while still taking
the circumstances of the case into account. Like the Hand Formula in tort
law, this test causes the court to consider the larger economic issues in
DMCA cases.
In the RealNetworks case, this test would probably be satisfied.
Streambox could have eliminated the substantial infringing uses of its
software by keeping the “copy switch” intact. This would have required no
cost at all, except that it may have made its products slightly less popular
because it would have only enabled time-shifting of content. The substantial
costs of the subsequent infringement to the content owners would definitely
be greater than the minimal costs for Streambox to keep the “copy switch”
intact.
Of the six proposed reasonable relationship tests, the most promising are
reasonable foreseeability, substantial non-infringing use, and the Aimster
balancing test. All three of these tests inject more procedural fairness into §
1201 actions by introducing a sense of reasonableness to the process. In early
2011, however, the Ninth Circuit muddied the appellate waters when it
resuscitated access right theory in MDY Industries.
VI. THE NINTH CIRCUIT TAKES THE OPPOSITE VIEW: MDY INDUSTRIES
In MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., the Ninth Circuit declined to
follow the Federal Circuit’s approach in Chamberlain III, holding that the
Federal Circuit’s decision was (1) contrary to the plain language of § 1201
and (2) overly dependent on policy considerations that are best left to
Congress, not the courts.57 In direct opposition to the Federal Circuit’s
ancillary action theory, the Ninth Circuit expressly endorsed access rights
theory, holding that “§ 1201(a) creates a new anti-circumvention right distinct
from the traditional exclusive rights of a copyright owner.”58
MDY Industries involved the Internet-based, massively multiplayer online
role-playing game, World of Warcraft (WoW), which is produced by Blizzard
Entertainment. In WoW, the players interact in a virtual world, role-playing
57. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. 09-15932, No. 09-16044, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3428, 46 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011).
58. MDY Industries, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428 at 47.
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different characters, such as humans, elves, and dwarves.59 A player’s
objective is to advance the character through the game, participating in quests
and battling monsters. WoW has over ten million subscribers worldwide,
with approximately two and half million in North America.60 The software
for WoW has two components: (1) the game client software that a player
installs on the player’s computer and (2) the game server software, which the
player accesses on a subscription basis by connecting to Blizzard’s online
servers.61
In 2005, a WoW player and software programmer, Michael Donnelly,
developed Glider, a software “bot” (short for robot) that automated play of
WoW’s early levels, for his personal use. Through the use of Glider,
Donnelly did not need to actually play the game in order to advance his
character through the early stages of the game. Instead, the Glider “bot”
would automatically play WoW according to pre-determined parameters
while Donnelly was eating dinner or going to a movie, for example.62 When
Donnelly returned, Gilder would have amassed experience and treasure for his
WoW character, allowing Donnelly to advance to higher levels with little
effort. In the summer of 2005, Donnelly began selling Glider to other WoW
subscribers through his company, MDY Industries, for fifteen to twenty-five
dollars per license.63
As a response to WoW players complaining about competing against
robots instead of real people, Blizzard banned the use of bots in an updated
license agreement.64 Then, in late 2005, Blizzard created the Warden
software, which inspects WoW player actions to detect and banish those using
bots to automate WoW characters.65 Warden was initially very effective at
detecting most Glider users and banning them from the game.66 MDY
Industries responded by modifying Glider to avoid detection by Warden,
offering it as a premium version on a subscription basis. By late 2008, MDY
Industries had gross revenues of $3.5 million based on 120,000 Glider
subscriptions.67
In late 2006, Blizzard threatened to sue MDY for copyright infringement;
MDY then filed for declaratory judgment, contending that Glider did not
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
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violate any of Blizzard’s rights.68 A series of actions in Arizona District
Court followed, culminating in a bench trial in January 2009, in which the
court held MDY Industries liable under §§ 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1).69 MDY
Industries appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
In early 2011, the Ninth Circuit found that Warden was a technological
measure designed to control access to the WoW game experience. Because
Glider was specifically designed to circumvent Warden, MDY Industries was
found to be trafficking in a circumvention device prohibited by § 1201.
However, the court also held that Glider neither created nor facilitated
copyright infringement. While Glider users violated the terms of the Blizzard
license, those terms were not related to the protection of Blizzard’s copyright.
In assessing Blizzard’s § 1201(a)(2) claims, the Ninth Circuit faced a
stark choice: it could follow the Federal Circuit’s new reasonable relation test
from Chamberlain III, or it could revert to access rights theory. If the court
applied the reasonable relation test, then Blizzard’s claim would fail, as the
court found that the use of Glider had no relationship at all to copyright
infringement.70 Under all six of the reasonable relation tests proposed supra,
Blizzard would fail to show a reasonable relation between the use of Glider
and traditional copyright infringement because Glider neither created nor
facilitated copyright infringement.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit chose to reject the Federal Circuit’s reasonable
relation test, holding that it is “contrary to the plain language of the statute.”71
The Ninth Circuit was unpersuaded by the Federal Circuit’s broad reading of
§ 1201 in context with traditional copyright law and policy.72 Rather, the
court focused narrowly on the text of the statute and the legislative record to
find that Congress intended to create a new “anti-circumvention right,” or
right of access, distinct from the traditional rights of copyright owners.73 In
contrast with the Federal Circuit’s approach, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling
to go beyond the bare text of § 1201. In the court’s view, adopting a
reasonable relation test would override congressional intent and add a “nontextual element” to § 1201.74
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s approach in MDY Industries creates a
circuit split, as the two appellate court’s holdings are completely incompatible
with each other. There is no middle ground to be found between the two
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. 8-9.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51-52.
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approaches, because MDY Industries expressly rejects all of the relevant
reasoning in Chamberlain III.
CONCLUSION
In light of the stark contrast between MDY Industries and Chamberlain
III, the time is now ripe for the Supreme Court to review the competing
interpretations of § 1201 and decide which court got it right. In the
alternative, Congress could amend § 1201 to clarify if they actually intended
to create a distinct right of access, disconnected from traditional copyright
law. Just as this article goes to press, Rep. Joe Lofgren has introduced H.R.
1892, the Unlocking Technology Act of 2013, which would effectively
resolve this circuit split in favor of the Federal Circuit’s interpretation. The
bill amends § 1201 to make clear that it is not a violation to circumvent a
technological measure if the purpose of the circumvention is to use a work in
a manner that is not an infringement of copyright.75
In this author’s opinion, the Federal Circuit’s reasonable relation test in
Chamberlain III brings § 1201 of the DMCA back in harmony with the rest of
the Copyright Act, creates a better balance of interests between copyright
owners and the reasonable expectations of consumers, prevents content
owners from misusing their limited monopoly under the Copyright Act, and
restricts the misuse of copyright for functional applications traditionally
protected by patent, such as replacement part markets. For the sake of public
policy and common sense, I hope the Supreme Court agrees.
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